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IN DEFENCE OF BOMBER COMMAND

Some historians, even former German leaders, claim Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force made a great contribution to forcing victory for the allies - in fact were instrumental in ending the war in Europe sooner than would have been the case had the bombing raids not been successful. Others maintain that many of the bombing attacks were unnecessary, that they were targeted on cities that neither produced, transported or harboured military hardware or personnel. There are claims that the men of Bomber Command who took part in the raids, as well as those that planned them, approved them and directed them, were all war criminals in no lesser degree than those who were proved guilty at the Nuremberg trials and since.

What are the facts?

Dr Albert Speer, the German Minister for Armament Production wrote after the war: "The strategic bombing of Germany was the greatest lost battle for Germany of the whole war, greater than all our losses in all our retreats from Russia and in the surrender of our armies in Stalingrad". Furthermore, Speer reported to Hitler on 19 January 1945: "It has now been determined that the attacks which take place so often at night are considerably more effective than daylight attacks, since heavier bombs are used and an extraordinary accuracy in obtaining the target is reported. Consequently, even if during the first quarter of 1945, the repair work and plants are completely untouched, the theoretical figures which seemed possible in the last quarter, will not be reached". The views of Speer, a dedicated Nazi, emphasise the contribution of Bomber Command in helping win the war for the Allies.

It is the Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command , Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, who receives most of the opprobrium from those who denigrate the efforts of Bomber Command. Yet Harris was only carrying out the orders of the British War Cabinet as relayed to him by Air Ministry who, on 5 May 1942, directed him to 'begin operations against primary industrial targets including Cologne, Duisberg, Dusseldorf and the North German ports'.

It must be admitted that right up to the first thousand bomber raid on Cologne on the moonlight night of 30/31 May 1942, the efforts of Bomber Command did not yield the hoped results. In the Cologne raid 1505 factories were totally destroyed and 630 badly damaged.

The Cologne raid had three major effects. One - it great harm to local industry, two - it proved to the German High Command that the Royal Air Force was capable of striking hard at industrial installations and three - it lifted the morale of the British people because it proved to them that, despite the catastrophe of most European countries being over-run by the Germans, there was a force capable of striking back at Germany.

From the moment he went to Bomber Command in 1942, Arthur Harris' stated aim was to devastate Germany by relentless bombing until the Nazis were forced to surrender.

Later he was supported in this policy by the United States Eighth Air Force under the command of General Carl Spaartz. Between Bomber Command and the Eighth Air Force, Germany was to be subjected to round- the- clock bombing as weather conditions permitted.

It was the industrial cities of the Ruhr, plus Berlin, that were the main targets in 1943. German defences were heavy and the casualties of Bomber Command crept up to the prohibitive average of ten per cent per operation.

On 10 June 1943, the Allied chiefs issued the Point Blank directive: " The mission of the United State and British bomber forces is to conduct a joint US / British air offensive to accomplish the progressive dislocation and disruption of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened"

In September 1944, the air commanders again were charged with "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic systems and the direct support of land and sea forces". It was on these statements that the target for tonight or the target for today was invariably chosen.

These directives indicate that both Bomber Command and the Eighth Air Force concentrated their effort on military and industrial targets, and not, as is alleged, on the civilian populations of Germany, Italy and occupied Europe.

There were some mistakes in the bombing program. Civilians inadvertently did become casualties but the intention was to bomb military targets, not the civilian population.

The most controversial bombing raid was that on Dresden.

Contrary to popular belief Dresden was not a city without military and industrial activities. Included within its boundaries were a Zeiss-Ikon optical factory, a Siemens glass factory, factories manufacturing radar and electronic components and fuses for anti-aircraft shells, as well as gas masks, engines for Junkers aircraft and cockpit parts for Messerschmitt fighters. Furthermore Dresden was a transportation center for the Russian-German battle zone which lay about 80 kms to the east of of Dresden. The attack was justified if only to assist the Russians who were experiencing great resistance in their approach to Dresden. Dresden was bombed because it was a justifiable military target

Neither I, nor many of my Bomber Command colleagues understand why the Dresden raid has been singled out as being so uniquely terrible. Was it any more terrible than the 26 April 1927 bombing of the Spanish town of Guernica by the Condor Legion of the German Luftwaffe which left that small town a pile of rubble and dead bodies? Was it any more terrible than the bombing and destruction of Rotterdam, of Warsaw, of Coventry, of the blitz on London and other major English cities by the Luftwaffe? Surely it cannot be compared with the deliberate targeting of London by the German V One's and V Two's which were programmed to fall indiscriminately on areas of civilian occupation.

Was the bomber offensive morally flawed? The only answer that can be given is that there was a war on, a war that was started by the elected leaders of Germany. Once war had broken out the important thing to do was to win it at any cost. Moral arguments against the bombing that overlook, dismiss or devalue that point are fundamentally flawed.

Has morality any place in war at all? Lord McCaugley, in 1931, summed up the argument that talk of moderation in war is ridiculous when he wrote: "The essence of war is violence; moderation in war is imbecility"

It is war itself that is immoral.

Neither the wrongs inflicted by the Germans, nor the devastation and death caused by Bomber Command make either of them right but Bomber Command were trying to right the wrongs wrought by the elected leaders of Germany who were the cause of the destruction of their cities and the death of its citizens.

The attack on Germany, Italy and the occupied countries of Europe by Bomber Command cost the lives of many thousands of Britons, Australians, New Zealanders, Canadians, South Africans and those who came from other countries of the British Commonwealth. More than 60 per cent of Bomber Command air crew died in the war in Europe. Some lay the blame for these deaths directly at Air Marshal Harris.

There are two views on Harris. One has been expressed by Freeman Dyson who, in his early 20's spent the war cozily working as a civilian in the Operational Research Section of Bomber Command headquarters. Dyson has written that Harris accepted no criticism, never admitted his mistakes and was as indifferent to the slaughter of his airmen as he was to the slaughter of German citizens. The other, and opposing view is that of the aircrew Harris commanded. They recognised that it was the duty of Harris to mount and direct an all- out offensive against Germany and Italy. Every man subliminally knew they were likely to die but each knew that Harris cared for them and they reciprocated his affection. Harris was revered by those of us who flew in Bomber Command as a great leader and a compassionate man. We who served under him believe it is tragic that his memory is demeaned, as are the efforts of those he commanded, by others who fail to recognise that Harris and his aircrew were largely instrumental in saving much of the world from coming under German domination with its inevitable horrendous consequences.

Winston Churchill summed it up when he said:" Night after night, month after month, our bomber squadrons travel far into Germany, find their targets in the darkness by the highest navigational skill, aim their attack often under the heaviest fire, often with serious loss, with deliberate, careful determination and inflict serious blows on the whole of the technical and war-making structure of the Nazi power. On no part of the Royal Air Force does the weight of the war fall more heavily than on the bombers. I have no hesitation in saying that this process of bombing the military industries and communications of Germany and the air bases and storage depots from which we are attacked, affords the most certain, if not the shortest, of all roads to victory"

Compared to World War One casualties on the Western Front and at Gallipoli, Bomber Command casualties were small in number but huge in percentage terms. The statistics are stark
* 110,000 aircrew were engaged in action against the enemy. Of those
* 56,100 (51 per cent) were killed in operations
* 9,900 (9 per cent) were killed in crashes in England
giving a 61 per cent death rate
* 3 per cent were seriously injured
* 12 per cent became prisoners of war
* 1 per cent evaded capture
and 23 per cent of us survived, physically unharmed.
An interesting comparison is that of the fifty thousand Australians who fought at Gallipoli
* 8,709 (17 per cent) were killed
* 18,235 (36 per cent) were wounded

The men of the Royal Australian Air Force who flew with Bomber Command were just over one per cent of all Australians who enlisted in World War Two yet the 3,486 Australians in the Command who died accounted for almost 20 per cent of all Australian deaths in combat.

Were the means adopted by Bomber Command to defeat Germany and Italy and the aircrew losses incurred by those means, justified by the ultimate victory over evil?

I leave you to decide - and to tell me your views at petereye@bigpond.net.au